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and Evidence from India*
This paper provides a framework for analyzing constraints that apply specifically to women, 
which theory suggests may have negative impacts on child outcomes (as well as on 
women). We classify women’s constraints into four dimensions: (i) domestic physcial and 
psychological abuse, (ii) low influence on household decisions, (iii) restrictions on mobility, 
and (iv) limited information access. Each of these constraints are in principle determined 
within households. We test the impact of women’s constraints on child outcomes 
using nationally representative household Demographic and Health Survey data from 
India, including 53,030 mothers and 113,708 children, collected in 2015-16. Outcomes 
are measured as multidimensional deprivations, utilizing UNICEF’s Multidimensional 
Overlapping Deprivation Analysis index, incorporating deficiencies in children’s access to 
water, sanitation, housing, healthcare, nutrition, education and information. We identify 
causal impacts using a Lewbel specification and present an array of additional econometric 
strategies and robustness checks. We find that children of women who are subjected to 
domestic abuse, have low influence in decision making, and limited freedom of mobility 
are more likely to be deprived.  
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1. Introduction  
This paper examines impacts of household-level constraints that primarily affect women on 
child deprivation. We focus on mobility restrictions, low influence on family spending and 
other household decisions, the extent of domestic physical and emotional abuse, and limited 
access to information. Women who face greater constraints may be less able to care for their 
children.1 In turn, if children are less well cared for, they will be potentially less healthy or 
less able to study, which also can have negative effects on their probability of survival and 
well-being.   
 
We test our framework for the impact of women’s constraints on child outcomes using 
nationally representative household Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) data from India, 
the National Family Health Survey 4 (NFHS-4), conducted in 2015/16.  These data include 
information on 53,030 mothers, 113,708 children ages 0-17, and 32,408 children ages 0-4 
who are living with their mothers.  
 
From the Indian NFHS-4 survey questionnaire we identify a set of variables indicating the 
extent of each of the four primary household-level gendered constraints on adult women that 
we postulate can negatively affect child wellbeing: 1) domestic physical and emotional abuse; 
2) family spending, contraception, and other household decision making; 3) mobility 
restrictions in going to health facilities, markets, and outside the village; 4) lack of 
information access, such as through radio and mobile phones. 
 
We measure child deprivation multidimensionally, using the template of UNICEF’s well-
known Multiple Overlapping Deprivation Analysis (MODA), which allows us to quantify 
child wellbeing using health, living standards, education and information dimensions. 
Following MODA, we incorporate deficiencies in children’s access to water, sanitation, 
housing, healthcare, nutrition, education and information.  
 
We then investigate whether there is a causal impact of constraints on women on child 
deprivations. We find that children whose mothers face more constraints are more likely to be 
deprived. We build on the literature on women’s empowerment, some of which has raised 
potential benefits of improving women’s empowerment indicators for improving child 
outcomes. However, the literature shows substantial differences of opinion on the appropriate 
definition and scope of the concept of empowerment in comparison with other concepts such 
as human rights. As a result, we focus our attention on a set of observable constraints, which 
in turn predict specific causal effects, rather than confine the analysis to a single definition of 
the component dimensions of empowerment, or unnecessarily confront complex estimation 
challenges (including latent variable problems).    
 
 
2. Conceptual framework  
 
In many settings, women face constraints that affect them substantially more than men, 
largely, if not solely, because of their gender. This paper focuses on four major sets of 
                                                 
1 Some gender-based constraints may affect only or primarily men, such as mandatory 
military service in some countries. However, these generally apply for a relatively short 
period of time, and at an early stage of life, making them unlikely to affect child outcomes.   
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constraints: gendered mobility restrictions, low influence on family spending and other 
decisions, limited access to information, and living with domestic abuse. These constraints 
differ from each other in significant ways.  For example, the presence of some of the 
constraints are widely understood to be violations of human (if not legal) rights, such as 
rights to protection from physical violence, and to freedom of mobility.  Other constraints 
may be viewed as an imbalance of power between men and women, as in a proportionately 
low influence over household decisions, or lower access to information - that is, as a more 
traditionally defined lack of women’s empowerment.  Generally, these constraints affect 
different aspects of a woman’s life;  yet, all the constraints examined share in common at 
least three features, particularly in developing countries: they are “women-specific” in that 
they limit the actions and choices of women markedly more than they do for men; they can 
be largely determined at the household level; and they have the potential to substantially 
worsen the scope for reducing child deprivations.   
 
Previous research in the literature leads us to hypothesize that each of the four types of 
constraint can significantly reduce women’s ability to care for their children and, therefore, 
lower child wellbeing. 
 
Impacts of domestic abuse. Domestic violence or abuse is, of course, one of the most pressing 
and serious constraints faced by women around the world. A United Nations (2018) study of 
femicide found that, unlike men, women are most likely to be victims of violence by intimate 
partners and other family members. A climate of domestic violence and other abuse, physical 
or psychological, can impair a mother’s caretaking abilities, as she becomes less physically 
and emotionally capable of providing for her children. Women suffering from abuse at home 
may be less able to provide their children with adequate nutrition, healthcare or sanitation. 
Depending on the extent of injuries her medical treatment and recovery may remove her from 
her children, or may reduce her mobility such as for accompanying children, and her capacity 
for other household activities, for extended periods. Psychological harm from abuse can also 
be debilitating. Furthermore, children who witness spousal abuse have been found to be more 
likely to suffer stress, depression, and other behavioral problems (Doyle and Aizer 2018).   
Similarly, witnessing violence between parents can potentially increase a child’s 
psychological stress, leading to worse general health outcomes (Ziaei, et al. 2014).2  Children 
born to victims of domestic violence are significantly more likely to die before the age of five 
(Rawlings and Siddique, 2018). Spouse abuse is also correlated with child abuse (Appel and 
Holden 1998; Doyle and Aizer 2018).  
 
Constrained influence on family spending. Women who have low influence on how to spend 
household income or in obtaining healthcare are potentially less able to provide adequate care 
for their children. Intuitively, the household division of labor that defines traditional male and 
female responsibilities puts much of child wellbeing in the hands of women. Improving 
women’s bargaining power over household resources is, therefore, hypothesized to improve 
nutrition, health, education and sanitation outcomes of children (Kabeer, 1999). Mothers’ 
increased influence enables them to target a larger fraction of any given amount of household 
resources towards improving child human capital (health, education) outcomes, therefore 
asserting their preference for child investment. Supporting this view, there is substantial 
evidence that higher shares of income or wealth controlled by women are associated with, if 
not causes of, improved child outcomes in many settings throughout the developing world 
                                                 
2 Moreover, victims of child abuse are more likely to grow up to abuse their own children 
(Oliver 1993).   
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(Bonilla et al 2017, De la Brière et al. 2003, Doss 2006, Imai et al 2014, Qian 2008, Schady 
and Rosero 2008, Yoong et al. 2012). This may be due to differences in preferences between 
men and women in the amount of resources devoted to children. Moreover, women may also 
be more effective at utilizing any family resources allocated to improve child outcomes.   
 
Restrictions on mobility. Women who cannot go freely to the market, health facilities or 
beyond their village are potentially constrained from getting food, healthcare and support for 
their children, at least in a timely and effective manner. For instance, enhanced freedom of 
mobility enables a mother to get her child to a health facility more easily and rapidly than if 
she has to wait for a designated member of the household to escort her before leaving the 
home. Similarly, an unconstrained mother may find it easier to go to her child’s school. When 
free to go to the market, mothers may purchase fresher and healthier food, making use of her 
knowledge of (and priority for) the child’s nutritional needs, as well as a greater variety of 
food, leading to improved basic nutrition and broader food security.  With expanded 
opportunity to choose economic activities and greater mobility, mothers may be able to 
contribute more to household income, resulting from, say, increased productivity or wage 
earnings.3   
 
Limited access to information. Women with limited access to media and communications 
may be unable to acquire information on providing effective care for their children. Mass 
media campaigns can disseminate well-defined messages to large audiences. Wakefield et al. 
(2010) conduct an extensive literature review and conclude that “mass media campaigns can 
produce positive changes or prevent negative changes in health-related behaviors across large 
populations.”4  Important agricultural extension information is broadcast by radio; this is 
especially important for women farmers, who are much less likely to receive visits from 
extension agents than men (Andersen and Feder 2007). Additionally, newspaper, radio, and 
television media campaigns can help families adapt to climate change5 while mobile phones 
provide a channel to receive information and communicate directly with others. There is 
experimental evidence of the impact of information on child outcomes in education, drinking 
water quality, and health.  In particular, parents may systematically underestimate the returns 
to their children’s education in making decisions about enrollment and hours spent studying, 
but respond when provided with better information.6  Similarly, there is evidence that 
households respond positively to improved information about health and sanitation.7  
                                                 
3 We do not include employment (or lack thereof) as a constraint category because its 
interpretation is not clear. For instance, a woman could be forced to work even if she chooses 
not to, therefore, work could be interpreted as a constraint. On the other hand, if a woman 
chooses to work and bring more income to the household, her bargaining power within the 
home could improve. Consequently, we focus on influence on family spending, which 
directly speaks to women’s constraints to access household resources.  
4 The quote is from Wakefield et al. (2010), page 1261. 
5 For an example of heat wave adaptation in Odisha, India see Das and Smith (2012) 
6 See Jensen (2012).  Eighth grade boys from randomly selected schools in the Dominican 
Republic were provided information on returns to schooling estimated from earnings data; 
those receiving this information completed about 0.2-0.35 more years of schooling on 
average (Jensen 2010). Nguyen (2008) found provision of additional information on 
schooling returns resulted in a 0.2 standard deviation improvement in test scores in 
Madagascar. 
7 For example, in India, Jalan and Somanthan (2008) found that informing households that 




Greater mobility, access to information, as well as a healthier, non-abusive environment for 
women may augment the effectiveness of human capital investment given any level of 
resources that may be allocated to children.  In general, mothers may be more effective in 
augmenting the impacts of any given specific resources allocated to children, thus causing 
better child outcomes 
 
If the constraints come from the household, a standard model of household bargaining results 
in less decision-making power of women than preferred by wives.  This results even if the 
husband considers its potential impact on child human capital – although the resulting 
constraints on the mother would be less than if he did not. Conceptually, the outcome of 
household bargaining may be taken as the initial level for an analysis of the effect of lifting 
constraints for child outcomes.  
 
Some other restrictions on women may be exogenous to the household, determined beyond 
the household or even neighboring areas.  Important examples are gender-based credit and 
labor market constraints. Exogenous constraints may include unexplained average gender 
wage differentials, lack of protection from violence beyond the household, and the directing 
of government services such as agricultural extension toward male heads of household. 
Relaxing these constraints could require higher-scale action such as a political initiative. 
Economy- or society- wide constraints generally require public policy response (see United 
Nations, 2017).  Constraints that cannot be relaxed from within households are outside the 
scope of our analysis.8  
 
 
3. Data   
 
We address the relationship between child wellbeing and women’s constraints using India’s 
DHS (NFHS-4), a large nationally representative household-level survey conducted in 
2015/16. The data includes 699,686 women aged from 15-49; 269,138 children under the age 
of 5; and 1,014,876 children aged from 0-17. Our analysis restricts the sample to children and 
mothers living together in the same household, and to mothers who were included in the 
subsample with questions about domestic abuse, the subsample who answered a longer 
questionnaire, administered at state level, which includes husband background questions, 
among other indicators. This sample is still representative at the state level, but not at further 
levels of geographical disaggregation for all indicators. The survey used a two-stage 
sampling strategy, also covering appropriately rural areas and slums in 4 major cities (see 
DHS 2017). Overall, our data set includes 113,708 and 32,408 children aged 0-17 and 0-4, 
respectively, who are living with their mothers. Our data set also includes information on 
53,030 mothers.   
 
                                                 
water. In Bangladesh, households informed their well water contained unsafe arsenic levels 
generally switched to a safer well (Madajewicz et al 2007). Dupas 2007) found that provision 
of information in Kenya on the relative risk of HIV infection by partner age led to a 
substantial reduction in teenage pregnancy, and substitution away from older (riskier) 
partners toward same-age partners. 
8 For example, most data on women’s labor market activities outside the home (including the 
dataset used in this paper) provide no indication of whether the work is coercive; and we 




3.1 Women’s Constraints 
 
We focus on four key dimensions of women’s constraints: (i) domestic abuse, (ii) low 
decision-making power, (iii) restricted mobility, and (iv) limited information access. We 
proxy for each dimension with indicators obtained from the survey questions, as summarized 
in Table 1.  
 
The domestic abuse dimension includes dichotomous variables equal to one if the woman has 
experienced physical or emotional violence. We also include a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
the woman agrees that there is at least one reason to beat a wife, labeled justify violence. We 
interpret the literature as indicating that some women do not perceive types of physical 
violence as abuse; the “justify violence” variable could capture that effect.  
 
The decision-making power dimensions focus on variables that capture the woman’s input 
into major purchases or the allocation of household financial resources. The mobility 
constraint dimension focuses on variables that highlight the woman’s autonomy to go to the 
market or outside her village. Finally, the information dimension includes indicators about 
how often the woman listens to the radio or reads newspapers.  
 
Table 1: Dimensions, indicators and survey questions 
 
Dimensions  Indicators Variable description 
Domestic 
abuse   
 
Domestic violence 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
woman notes that she experienced any 




Dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
woman indicates that her husband has 
ever said something to humiliate her in 
front to others, threatened to harm her, 
or insulted her.  
 
Justifies violence 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
woman believes that it is justifiable for a 
husband to beat a woman if she goes 
out, neglects the children, argues, 
refuses sex, cooks poorly, is unfaithful, 
and or is disrespectful.  
Decision-
making 
power   
 
No power on earnings 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
woman has no power to decide over 
how her husband's earnings will be used. 
 
No power on woman’s own 
healthcare 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
woman is not the main decision maker 




No power on major purchase 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
woman has no power to make decisions 
about large household purchases.  
 
No power on contraception 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
woman has no power to make decisions 
about the use of contraception. 
 
No power on visits to 
relatives/friends 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
woman has no power to decide when to 
visit friends or family members. 
Mobility   
 
Not allowed to market 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
woman is not usually allowed to go to 
the market.  
 
Not allowed to health facility 
alone 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
woman is not usually allowed to go to 
health facilities alone. 
 
Not allowed outside village  
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
woman is not usually allowed to go to 
outside of her village/community.  
Information   
 
Never reads magazine/paper 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
woman says that she never reads a 
newspaper or magazine.  
 
Never listens to radio 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
woman says that she never listens to the 
radio. 
  
Does not have cellphone 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
woman does not have any mobile phone 
that she can use. 
Source: Indicators are generated using data from India DHS (National Family Health Survey 
4 – NFHS-4).  
 
 
3.2 Child wellbeing 
 
Child wellbeing is defined using UNICEF’s Multidimensional Overlapping Deprivation 
Analysis (MODA) (Gordon et al., 2003; de Neubourg et al. 2013). The range of deprivation 
goes from 0 to d, where d is the total number of dimensions defined in the specific 
application of the methodology. Dimensions and indicators take into account the life cycle of 
the child and are defined accordingly. In this study, we employ the Cross Country MODA 
used to comparatively assess child multidimensional deprivation over several countries (de 
Milliano and Plavgo, 2017), which defines seven dimensions of deprivations.  
 
Children are deprived if they lack access to (i) water; (ii) sanitation; (iii) adequate housing; 
(iv) healthcare; (v) nutrition; (vi) education and/or; (vii) information. Table 2 describes how 
MODA is calculated in this study, highlighting each dimension, indicator and weight. The 
dimensions naturally vary by age to reflect that different sources of deprivation facing 
children change at different life stages: there are two age groups, under five, and 5 to 17 years 
old; the 3 household dimensions are common to both age groups, while the other two are 




By convention, MODA aggregates indicators within each of the dimensions using a “union 
approach”. That is, a child is counted as deprived in a given dimension if deprived in any of 
the indicators that composes the dimension.  As child deprivations may frequently go 
undetected, using more than one indicator in each dimension may provide a way to avoid a 
Type II error.9  
 
Table 2: Construction of MODA 
Dimension  Age group Deprived if: 
Water  0-17 Un-improved source of drinking water (surface waters, unprotected wells or spring—WHO definition) 
   Distance to water: more than 30’ round trip 
Sanitation  0-17 Unimproved toilet facility (no toilet, bucket, pit toilet without slab—WHO definition) 
Housing  0-17 Floor and roof are both of natural/non-permanent materials 




Child lives in a house where mother had un-skilled birth 
assistance (traditional healers, not trained midwife, 
friends/relatives, none) 




Infant and young child feeding (IYCF): child lives in a 
household where children under 2 are not adequately fed 
(according to age and breastfeeding status) 
  0-4 Wasting (weight for age < -2 s.d. from WHO reference) 
Education  5-17 No enrolled in primary school (children of primary age) 
  5-17 Not finished primary (from age of end of primary to age 17) 
Information  5-17 No access to any information or communication device 
Source: adapted from de Neubourg et al., 2012. DPT = Diphtheria, Tetanus, and Pertussis; 
WHO = World Health Organization. 
 
A child is defined as multidimensionally deprived if the number of her/his deprivations is 
greater or equal to a predefined cut-off.10 We use cut-off points of two dimensions in our 
preferred specification and of one and three dimensions in robustness exercises. A measure of 
child wellbeing using a cut-off of two or more dimensions is most widely used in the 
literature (de Milliano, Plavgo, 2017).   
 
Table 3 shows headcounts of the first three cut-offs of MODA (deprived in at least one, two, 
or three dimensions), by gender and location. Approximately 36 percent of children in the 
dataset are deprived in two or more dimensions, while 12 percent are deprived in three or 
more. More than two-thirds (69%) of children suffer at least one deprivation. The table also 
reveals a statistically significant difference between boys and girls. Approximately 37 percent 
of girls are deprived in two or more dimensions, compared to 35 percent of boys. The urban-
rural distinction is both statistically significant, and more striking – approximately 16 percent 
                                                 
9 Of course, this approach would likely increase the corresponding Type II error.   
10 Most MODA studies produce and report results for more than one possible cut-off.  
9 
 
of urban children are deprived in 2 or more dimensions, compared with 43 percent of rural 
children deprived.  
 
 
Table3: MODA by gender and location, percent of children, 2015-6.  




68.74 47.99 76.19 67.86 69.73 0.000 
Deprived in 
2+ 
35.63 16.25 42.60 34.72 36.67 0.000 
Deprived in 
3+ 
12.04 3.81 15.01 11.67 12.46 0.000 
N 113,708 30,063 83,645 60,261 53,447  
 
Notes: Calculations based on a sample of 113,708 children aged 0-17, India DHS 205-16. Wald test of 





4. Empirical Methods 
Our analysis focuses on understanding the impact of women’s constraints on child wellbeing. 
We estimate the following model: 
 
                                     𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 =  𝛽𝛽1𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐻𝐻 + 𝛽𝛽5𝐿𝐿 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,                       (1) 
 
where D represents the wellbeing of child i of mother j. The variable C is a constrained 
indicator of mother j of child i, as described above. The variables K and M are child and 
mother characteristics, respectively. Children’s characteristics, K, include age and gender, 
while M includes the mother’s level of educational attainment, age, work status and access to 
credit. The latter is proxied with two variables: a dummy equal to one if the woman has ever 
taken out a loan and a dummy equal to one if she is aware of programs that provide credit or 
loans. The variables H and L are household and location characteristics, respectively. 
Household characteristics are captured by the wealth index,11 the husband’s level of 
educational attainment and age, household size, and whether the household owns agricultural 
land. Location controls include whether the household is in a rural area and regional (state-
level) fixed effects. Equation (1) is also estimated using strata clusters identified at the tehsil 
(taluk) level.12 Finally, 𝜀𝜀 is an idiosyncratic error term. Descriptive statistics of the main 
variables used in the study are summarized in Table A1 in Appendix A. 
 
Child deprivation, 𝐷𝐷, is equal to one if the child is deprived according to predetermined cut-
offs. Our first set of results uses a standard OLS approach, which approximates the 
                                                 
11 The wealth index was created using principal component analysis. Included variables are 
refrigerator, motorcycle, car, phone, TV, bicycle, and land. (see de Neubourg et al., 2012). 




probability of the effect of the regressors on the dependent variable. However, standard OLS 
regressions can be biased due to the well-known unboundedness problem – coefficient 
estimates may suggest that the absolute value of the change in the dependent variable is more 
than one. In other words, OLS estimates can give predicted probabilities below zero or above 
one. Therefore, we also present probit estimates, which do not have this potential problem. 
  
In equation (1), the variables D and C are potentially endogenous because women’s 
constraints and children’s wellbeing can be jointly determined. For instance, predominant 
political views in the household could lower or increase women’s constraints, while 
simultaneously determining the values that the household places on, say, children’s education 
or health. In the absence of direct indicators of family preferences for children’s wellbeing 
and outcomes, an estimated relationship between D and C could be spurious.  
 
We address endogeneity using an array of econometric techniques. Our preferred 
specification is taken from Lewbel (2012), which proposes the use of a two-stage-least 
squares (2SLS) strategy that includes internally-constructed heteroskedasticity-based 
instruments. Lewbel shows that internal instruments can be constructed from the auxiliary 
equations’ residuals, which are multiplied by each of the included exogenous variables in 
mean-centered form. The Lewbel approach also allows us to use a combination of internal 
and the external instrumental variable, thus providing us with three different estimation 
approaches: external instruments (E), internal instruments (I), and both internal and external 
(I+E). The external instrument is a dichotomous variable equal to one if the respondent 
agrees that she is justified in refusing to have sex with her husband because she is tired or not 
in the mood (reasons for sex). Intuitively, this variable is likely to directly explain women’s 
constraints in the household by highlighting a prominent feature of the father and mother’s 
relationship, but not so directly the relationship between the mother and child. Approximately 
77 percent of women in the sample responded yes to this question. Furthermore, after 
controlling for women’s constraints in the econometric analyses, the relationship between this 
variable and child wellbeing is insignificant. Finally, F-tests from the first stage of two-stage-
least squares regressions suggest that the variable is appropriate. 
 
Lewbel (I+E) is our preferred approach because it overidentifies the first stage equations and 
allows us to produce tests for the validity of instruments.  For robustness, we also present 
standard 2SLS estimates using the external instrumental variable.  
 
The results from the Lewbel specifications as well as the 2SLS regressions can be 
problematic, as mentioned above, because of the unboundedness problem. Consequently, we 
also fit instrumental variable probit models using the instrument. However, Dong and Lewbel 
(2015) explain that IV probit models with binary endogenous regressors can give inconsistent 
results because the maximum likelihood estimation requires a complete parametric 
specification of how each endogenous regressor depends on the set of instruments and on the 
errors. Thus, if the endogenous regressor is not a continuous variable, the first stage of IV 
probit model is potentially biased.13  
 
                                                 
13 Dong and Lewbel (2015) propose a model that requires both an instrumental variable and a 
‘special regressor’.  The latter is meant to be strictly exogenous and appear additively in the 
model. Unfortunately, strictly exogenous regressors that satisfy both an empirical and 
theoretical criteria are not available.  
11 
 
Consequently, we take advantage of the binary nature of the endogenous variables and apply 
Propensity Score Matching (PSM) techniques to account for endogeneity. PSM is 
advantageous over other techniques, such as OLS or probit estimators, because although the 
procedure to calculate propensity scores is parametric, using propensity scores to compute 
causal effects is nonparametric. Thus, using the PSM to calculate causal effects is less 





5.1 Benchmark OLS Estimates  
  
Table 4, panels A to D present the OLS results of the estimation of equation (1).14 Appendix 
B Tables B1-B4 present a comparison of the OLS and probit results. Those tables reveal no 
significant differences in the size and sign of coefficient estimates, suggesting that the results 
do not suffer from an unboundedness problem.  The dependent variable in Table 4 is child 
wellbeing, which is defined with a dummy variable equal to 1 if the child is deprived in two 
or more dimensions. The main variables of interest are the various women’s constraint 
indicators. Panel A focuses on domestic abuse, Panel B focuses on decision making 
constraints, Panel C on mobility, and Panel D on information constraints. A positive 
coefficient indicates that an increase in constraints on women is conditionally associated with 
an increase in child deprivations. Controls include the asset index, age, husband's years of 
education, husband's age, household size, religion indicators, and dummy variables for rural 
location, the household having agricultural land, the mother not working, working in 
agriculture, literacy, low education, whether the mother has ever taken out a loan, and 
awareness of programs that provide credit or loans.   
 
Panel A reveals that domestic physical and emotional violence, as well as the justification of 
violence are all positively associated with child deprivation. Similarly, Panel B shows that 
women who have limited or no decision power when it comes to how to spend household 
earnings, access healthcare, undertake major household expenditures, or visit relatives are 
also more likely to have multidimensionally deprived children. The coefficient estimate 
attached to decision making power over contraception is found to be statistically significant 
at the 12 percent level, which also suggests that there is a positive correlation between this 
constraint and child wellbeing. Panel C also shows that women who are mobility constrained 
are more likely to have deprived children. Finally, Panel D reveals that lack of access to 
information correlates negatively with child wellbeing. Children of women who never read 
newspapers or magazines and those of women without cell phones are more likely to be 




                                                 
14 The number of observations varies depending on the number of observations for each 
constraint. In particular, the decision on contraception is asked only to women who are using 
any kind of contraception. We decided to not restrict the sample further to include only 
women with all valid values for constraints and to allow for more variability. This results in 
different observation numbers. The full regressions including the controls are available in the 






Table 4: Women’s constraints and children’s deprivation (2+), OLS results 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A: Domestic abuse       
Physical  0.017***     
 [3.28]     
Emotional  0.029***    
  [4.20]    
At least 1 reason to beat wife   0.012***   
   [2.64]   
Other controls? Yes Yes Yes   
Observations 104,415 104,398 107,132   
R-squared 0.26 0.26 0.26   
      
Panel B: Decision power       
Earnings 0.027**     
 [2.46]     
Healthcare  0.015***    
  [3.16]    
Purchases   0.012**   
   [2.52]   
Visits    0.015***  
    [3.14]  
Contraception     0.015+ 
     [1.59] 
Other controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 100,126 109,206 109,206 109,206 64,409 
R-squared 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.25 
      
Panel C: Mobility       
Market 0.013*     
 [1.72]     
Health facility  0.022**    
  [2.48]    
Outside the village   0.0050   
   [1.16]   
Other controls? Yes Yes Yes   
Observations 109,224 109,224 109,224   
R-squared 0.27 0.27 0.27   
      
Panel D: Information       
Read newspapers 0.022***     
 [4.31]     
Listen to radio  -0.0090    
  [-1.47]    
Have cell phone   0.040***   
   [8.22]   
State FE? Yes Yes Yes   
Other controls? Yes Yes Yes   
Observations 109,224 109,224 109,224   
R-squared 0.27 0.27 0.28   
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Notes: Robust t-statistics in brackets, ***, ** and * denote 1, 5 and 10 percent level of significance, 
respectively. + denotes a p-value of 0.11. All regressions are clustered at the Strata level. Other 
controls include a rural dummy, the asset index, a dummy equal to one if the mother has ever taken 
out a loan, a dummy equal to one if the mother is aware of programs that provide credit or loans, a 
dummy for not working, dummy for working in agriculture, a literacy dummy, low education dummy, 
age, husband's years of education, husband's age, household size, dummy for the household having 




In sum, the findings in Table 4 are indicative that women’s constraints and child deprivation 
are strongly correlated. However, the table is unable to properly determine a causal 
relationship. The following section addresses this issue with a variety of methods.  
 
 
5.2 Main specification     
 
We address potential endogeneity between women’s constraints and child wellbeing using 
several econometric techniques and robustness checks. Table 5 shows our preferred 
specification, which uses the methodology proposed in Lewbel (2012) with both internal and 
external instruments (I+E), providing the most convincing estimation of potential causal 
impacts. The use of I+E allows us to test for the validity of our instruments using Hansen J 
tests. The last row of each panel presents a p-value for a Hansen J test of the instruments, 
with larger values confirming the validity of the instrument set. We interpret a result as causal 
if the coefficient estimate attached to a variable is found to be statistically significant and if 
the regression passes the Hansen test. As with the previous table, the results are divided into 
four panels covering constraints related to violence (A), decision power (B), mobility (C), 
and information (D). The table shows the results of the coefficients estimates of the variables 
of interest within each in panel.  
 
Overall, Table 5 shows evidence that women who experience emotional violence, restrictions 
on how to use household earnings, as well as those that cannot access health facilities on their 
own nor regularly read newspapers have children that are more likely to be deprived in more 
than two dimensions of MODA.  The Hansen J p-value confirm a causal relationship between 
emotional violence, earnings, and access to health facilities with child deprivation with the 
remaining variables indicating only a positive correlation.  
 
We also estimated Table 5 without the credit variables. We excluded these controls as a 
robustness check. Credit is arguably a domain of women’s constraints, and most constraints 
are correlated. The results, available in the online appendix, are consistent with those found 
in Table 5; indeed the only differences are that restrictions to contraception usage and lack of 
access to health facilities are also found to have a causal and statistically significant 
relationship with child deprivation with this alternative specification.15  
                                                 
15 In an additional robustness test, we include the wealth index and its squared term in the 
Lewbel (I+E) regressions. The results suggest that child deprivation decreases with 
household wealth at a decreasing rate – as the index approximates its sample mean, the 
relationship between wealth and deprivation becomes positive. A plausible explanation for 
this result is that there is a tendency in India to pull women out of the labor force as soon as 
the family can "afford" to do so, in which case the implication (questionable as it is) could be 






Table 5: Women’s constraints and children’s deprivation (2+), Lewbel (I+E) results 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A: Domestic abuse       
Physical  0.0041     
 [0.38]     
Emotional  0.044***    
  [2.96]    
At least 1 reason to beat wife   0.0086   
   [0.52]   
Other controls (inc. State FE)? Yes Yes Yes   
Observations 104,415 104,398 107,132   
R-squared 0.28 0.28 0.28   
Hansen J p-value 0.18 0.37 0.027   
      
Panel B: Decision power       
Earnings 0.027**         
 [2.41]         
Healthcare   0.0063       
   [0.40]       
Purchases     0.019     
     [1.19]     
Visits       0.010   
       [0.71]   
Contraception         0.042+ 
         [1.62] 
Other controls (inc. State FE)? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 100,126 109,206 109,206 109,206 64,409 
R-squared 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.25 
Hansen J p-value 0.36 0.13 0.052 0.18 0.72 
      
Panel C: Mobility       
Market 0.012       
 [1.10]       
Health facility   0.021*     
   [1.78]     
Outside the village     0.015   
     [0.78]   
Other controls (inc. State FE)? Yes Yes Yes   
Observations 109,224 109,224 109,224   
R-squared 0.27 0.27 0.27   
Hansen J p-value 0.046 0.65 0.014   
      
Panel D: Information       
Read newspapers 0.045***       
 [7.33]       
Listen to radio   0.0054     
   [0.43]     
Have cell phone     0.024   
     [1.11]   
Other controls (inc. State FE)? Yes Yes Yes   
Observations 109,224 109,224 109,224   
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R-squared 0.27 0.27 0.28   
Hansen J p-value 0.000031 0.047 0.016   
 
Notes: Robust t-statistics in brackets, ***, ** and * denote 1, 5 and 10 percent level of 
significance, respectively. + denotes a p-value of 0.104. All regressions are clustered at the 
Strata level. Other controls include a rural dummy, the asset index, a dummy equal to one if 
the mother has ever taken out a loan, a dummy equal to one if the mother is aware of 
programs that provide credit or loans, a dummy for not working, dummy for working in 
agriculture, a literacy dummy, low education dummy, age, husband's years of education, 
husband's age, household size, dummy for the household having agricultural land, the reasons 
for sex dummy, and religion indicators. 
 
 
5.3 Robustness Checks 
 
As a robustness check, in Table 6 we show estimates of equation (1) using an array of 
instrumental variable techniques. Column 1 shows two-stage least squares estimates, column 
2 presents the estimates using internally constructed instruments (Lewbel I), column 3 
presents the IV-probit estimates, and column 4 shows the results of estimates using PSM with 
local linear regression matching methods.16  
 
Overall, the IV results provide mixed evidence of a positive, causal and statistically 
significant relationship between women’s constraints and child wellbeing. None of the 
indicators were found to be consistently positive and significant across every specification.  
 
Each of the methods for which results are presented in Table 6 have important advantages 
and drawbacks. However, the Lewbel (I) specification and PSM are likely to be more reliable 
for the reasons discussed in the Methodology section. Lewbel methods overidentify the first 
stage equation, allowing us estimate Hansen tests for the validity of the instruments. 
Furthermore, the coefficient estimates attached to the variables of interest in the Lewbel (I) 
regressions do not suffer from the unboundedness problem, which suggests that they are 
reliable.17 Similarly, as argued above, PSM estimates are less susceptible to the violation of 
model assumptions (Li, 2013).   
 
Consequently, using the Lewbel (I) and PSM estimates, we can conclude that there is 
evidence that child wellbeing is negatively affected by constraints related to emotional 
violence, lack of decision power regarding the use of earnings and the use of contraception, 
lack of autonomous access to health facilities, and information constraints captured by 
reading newspapers. The Hansen p-values of the Lewbel (I) method suggest that emotional 
violence, restriction on the use of earnings and contraception, as well as restrictions accessing 
health facility cause child deprivation.  
 
 
                                                 
16 As an additional robustness exercise, we also use PSM with the following matching 
algorithms: one and four nearest-neighbors, radius, and Kernel. The results, available upon 
request, are consistent with the local linear regression results.  
17 Appendix Table B5 replicates the Lewbel (I) and (I+E) results and the corresponding 
Hansen-J p-values. Overall, the table suggests that the instrument sets are valid. 
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Table 6: Women’s constraints and children’s deprivation (2+), IV tests (marginal 
effects) and PSM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable/Method 2SLS Lewbel (I) IV-Probit PSM 
Physical violence 0.28 0.0035 0.70 0.016** 
 [1.21] [0.33] [0.98] [2.34] 
Emotional violence 0.37 0.043*** 0.92 0.01*** 
 [1.19] [2.92] [0.95] [4.24] 
OK to beat wife 0.20* 0.0012 0.57 0.014** 
 [1.70] [0.071] [1.53] [2.22] 
Can't decide: Earnings 0.51 0.027** 0.97 0.04** 
 [0.71] [2.41] [0.41] [2.58] 
Can't decide: Healthcare 0.21 0.0036 0.57 0.022*** 
 [1.55] [0.22] [1.32] [3.20] 
Can't decide: Purchases 0.18 0.016 0.49 0.21*** 
 [1.54] [0.98] [1.29] [3.11] 
Can't decide: Visits 0.16 0.0072 0.43 0.22*** 
 [1.55] [0.50] [1.28] [3.12] 
Can't decide: Contraception -0.014 0.043* -0.057 0.025* 
 [-0.099] [1.67] [-0.11] [1.96] 
Can't go: Market -3.71 0.012 -3.41*** 0.024** 
 [-0.56] [1.11] [-4.98] [2.29] 
Can't go: Health facility 1.17 0.021* 2.64* 0.028** 
 [1.30] [1.76] [1.75] [2.25] 
Can't go: Out of village 0.28 0.0099 0.75 0.01* 
 [1.52] [0.50] [1.42] [1.69] 
Read newspapers -1.87 0.045*** -2.49*** 0.082*** 
 [-0.87] [7.34] [-3.15] [3.73] 
Listens to radio -0.37 0.0067 -0.99 -0.018* 
 [-1.48] [0.53] [-1.35] [1.90] 
Have cell phone 2.18 0.023 2.24*** 0.034*** 
 [0.65] [1.07] [5.50] [3.66] 
Notes: Robust t-statistics in brackets, ***, ** and * denote 1, 5 and 10 percent level of 
significance, respectively. All regressions are clustered at the Strata level. PSM is calculated 
using local linear regression matching algorithms. Other controls include child gender, age, 
location, the wealth index, a dummy equal to one if the mother has ever taken out a loan, a 
dummy equal to one if the mother is aware of programs that provide credit or loans, a dummy 
for whether the mother is not working or if she works in agriculture, a dummy for whether 
the mother can read a full sentence, mother’s education, agricultural land, and household size. 
 
For additional robustness checks, Table 7 replicates the methods in Tables 2 and 5 using 
children deprived in at least one (1+) and three (3+) dimensions as dependent variables, 
respectively. The OLS and Lewbel results are summarized in the left and right panels of 
Table 8, respectively. Using 3+ dimensions is a stricter approach to deprivation. In our 
sample, approximately 12 percent of children are deprived in at least three dimensions. On 
the other hand, 68 percent of children are deprived in one or more dimensions.  
 
The OLS results are consistent with those found above. We discover a positive association 
with child deprivation in at least one dimension with all forms of domestic abuse, as well as 
lack of decision power with respect to purchases and visits. The results also reveal a positive 
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association between deprivation in at least three dimensions and physical and emotional 
abuse, lack of decision power in all components, as well as mobility restrictions pertaining to 
leaving the village. Regarding information, we find evidence of a positive association with 
constraints on mobile phones, yet a negative association with reading newspapers.    
 
As with Table 5, in Table 7 we use the Hansen tests coupled with the standard t-tests to 
interpret the results. The table suggests that mothers suffering from emotional violence are 
more likely to have children deprived in at least one and at least three dimensions, 
respectively. Interestingly, column 5 also shows evidence of a positive, causal and 
statistically significant relationship between access to healthcare and children being deprived 
in at least 3 dimensions. Column 5 also suggests that information restrictions are positively 
related with a child being deprived in at least three dimensions; however, we cannot conclude 
that this relationship is causal.  
 
Table 7: Children deprived in 1+ and 3+ dimensions and women’s constraints, OLS and 
Lewbel (I+E) results 
 
Model: OLS Results  Lewbel (I+E) results 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dep. Variable: Dep. 1+ Dep. 3+ Dep. 1+ Hansen Dep. 3+ Hansen 
 Estimates Estimates Estimates p-value Estimates p-value 
Physical violence 0.019*** 0.0066* -0.0055 0.055 -0.0009 0.0065 
 [4.51] [1.81] [-0.61]  [-0.11]  
Emotional violence 0.029*** 0.014*** 0.023* 0.39 0.032** 0.37 
 [5.11] [2.73] [1.90]  [2.55]  
OK to beat wife 0.015*** 0.0029 0.0026 0.0053 -0.0029 0.028 
 [3.85] [0.94] [0.15]  [-0.23]  
Can't decide: Earnings 0.012 0.035*** 0.013 0.49 0.035*** 0.092 
 [1.41] [3.91] [1.54]  [3.88]  
Can't decide: Healthcare 0.0011 0.0096*** -0.0023 0.11 0.026** 0.19 
 [0.25] [2.63] [-0.16]  [2.33]  
Can't decide: Purchases 0.0075* 0.010*** -0.024 0.16 0.018 0.025 
 [1.75] [2.87] [-1.43]  [1.43]  
Can't decide: Visits 0.0090** 0.0072** 0.002 0.45 0.0065 0.058 
 [2.12] [2.10] [0.15]  [0.65]  
Can't decide: Contraception -0.00077 0.016** 0.013 0.7 0.0079 0.52 
 [-0.090] [2.42] [0.63]  [0.40]  
Can't go: Market 0.00093 0.0061 0.0097 0.033 0.0038 0.0083 
 [0.15] [1.14] [1.06]  [0.45]  
Can't go: Health facility 0.0035 0.0050 0.0089 0.22 -4.7E-05 0.15 
 [0.48] [0.77] [0.92]  [-0.0052]  
Can't go: Out of village -0.0025 0.0062** -0.0025 0.042 0.0051 0.083 
 [-0.62] [2.05] [-0.11]  [0.34]  
Read newspapers 0.057*** -0.0058* 0.051*** 0.035 0.019*** 4.90E-06 
 [10.0] [-1.92] [7.09]  [5.55]  
Listens to radio -0.0035 -0.0021 -0.017 0.11 0.017** 0.0019 
 [-0.58] [-0.54] [-1.21]  [2.34]  
Have cell phone 0.046*** 0.019*** -0.013 0.000072 0.036*** 5.60E-06 
  [10.5] [6.58] [-0.61]   [2.75]   
Notes: Robust t-statistics in brackets, ***, ** and * denote 1, 5 and 10 percent level of 
significance, respectively. All regressions are clustered at the Strata level. Other controls 
include a rural dummy, the asset index, a dummy equal to one if the mother has ever taken 
out a loan, a dummy equal to one if the mother is aware of programs that provide credit or 
loans, a dummy for not working, dummy for working in agriculture, a literacy dummy, low 
education dummy, age, husband's years of education, husband's age, household size, dummy 
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for the household having agricultural land, the reasons for sex dummy, and religion 
indicators. 
 
The regressions above do not include caste controls because of data availability. The survey 
asked respondents if they belong to scheduled caste, scheduled tribe, or other backwards 
caste. Unfortunately, there were many missing observations leading us to lose approximately 
5,000 to 10,000 observations in the baseline regressions. As a result, we only include dummy 
variables if a woman belongs to a scheduled caste, scheduled tribe, or other backwards caste 
in robustness exercises. These results are summarized in Table 8, where the OLS results and 
Lewbel (I+E) results are summarized in the left and right panels, respectively. The table 
shows results using children deprived in 1+, 2+ and 3+ dimensions of MODA as dependent 
variables, respectively.   
 
The OLS reveal a positive association between all definitions of child deprivation and women 
who suffer from emotional violence, restrictions on household purchases and visits, as well as 
not regularly using mobile phones. We also find a positive association between children 
being deprived in at least one dimension and their mothers suffering from all types of 
domestic abuse, facing restriction on the use of household earnings for purchases, facing 
restrictions on making visits, and being information constrained with regards to access to 
newspapers and mobile services. There is also a positive association between children 
deprived in at least three dimension and emotional violence, all the decision constraints, 
leaving the village and access to mobile phones. The results using deprivation in at least two 
dimensions are entirely consistent with those found above.  
 
As before, the Lewbel results are interpreted as valid when they pass both Hansen J tests 
standard t-tests. Column 5 shows that the results using child deprivation in two or more 
dimensions as the dependent variable are very much robust to the inclusion of caste controls. 
Women who experience emotional violence, restrictions on how to use household earnings, 
as well as those that cannot access health facilities on their own have children that are more 
likely to be deprived in more than two dimensions of MODA.   
 
Column 6 also suggest that mothers suffering from emotional violence are more likely to 
have children deprived in at least three dimensions. Additionally, there is evidence of a 
positive and statistically significant relationship between access to healthcare and earnings 
with children being deprived in at least three dimensions. We further uncover evidence 
suggesting that information restrictions are positively associated with a child being deprived 
in at least three dimensions. However, unlike Table 7, the Hansen J statistics do not accept 
the null hypothesis that the instrument set is valid instrument; thus, we cannot statistically 
confirm that these relationships are causal when including caste controls. Similarly, column 4 
cannot confirm a statistically significant relationship between women’s constraints and 
children being deprived in at least one dimension.  
 
Table 8: Children deprived in 1+, 2+, and 3+ dimensions and women’s constraints 
including caste controls, OLS and Lewbel (I+E) results 
 
Model: OLS Results  Lewbel (I+E) results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dep. Variable: Dep. 1+ Dep. 2+ Dep. 3+ Dep. 1+ Dep. 2+ Dep. 3+ 
Physical violence 0.016*** 0.013** 0.0035 -0.0031╬ 0.00049╬ -0.0025 
 [3.88] [2.47] [0.94] [-0.34] [0.045] [-0.30] 
Emotional violence 0.028*** 0.026*** 0.012** 0.016╬ 0.039***, ╬ 0.030** 
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 [4.87] [3.68] [2.29] [1.35] [2.68] [2.39] 
OK to beat wife 0.018*** 0.014*** 0.0038 0.01 0.018 0.0028 
 [4.54] [3.24] [1.22] [0.59] [1.14] [0.23] 
Can't decide: Earnings 0.0091 0.023** 0.032*** 0.01╬ 0.023**, ╬ 0.032*** 
 [1.05] [2.12] [3.60] [1.17] [2.07] [3.64] 
Can't decide: Healthcare 0.00092 0.015*** 0.0094** -0.0061╬ 0.0029╬ 0.025**, ╬ 
 [0.21] [3.14] [2.55] [-0.41] [0.18] [2.32] 
Can't decide: Purchases 0.0093** 0.013*** 0.0096*** -0.02╬ 0.015╬ 0.016 
 [2.19] [2.64] [2.65] [-1.18] [0.91] [1.34] 
Can't decide: Visits 0.0100** 0.016*** 0.0069** 0.0054╬ 0.01╬ 0.0049 
 [2.34] [3.29] [1.96] [0.40] [0.68] [0.47] 
Can't decide: Contraception 0.00031 0.016+ 0.015** 0.014╬ 0.048*, ╬ 0.0089╬ 
 [0.037] [1.64] [2.21] [0.67] [1.83] [0.43] 
Can't go: Market 0.0051 0.018** 0.0087 0.0073 0.015╬ 0.0081╬ 
 [0.81] [2.47] [1.62] [0.81] [1.34] [0.98] 
Can't go: Health facility 0.0039 0.025*** 0.0056 0.011╬ 0.027**, ╬ 0.0042 
 [0.53] [2.79] [0.86] [1.16] [2.17] [0.45] 
Can't go: Out of village -0.0035 0.005 0.0059* 0.0087 0.029╬ 0.012 
 [-0.88] [1.14] [1.91] [0.37] [1.41] [0.84] 
Read newspapers 0.057*** 0.024*** -0.0054* 0.051*** 0.048*** 0.021*** 
 [9.87] [4.58] [-1.74] [6.92] [7.55] [5.96] 
Listens to radio -0.0069 -0.01 -0.002 -0.035**, ╬ -0.0014╬ 0.017** 
 [-1.13] [-1.62] [-0.50] [-2.39] [-0.11] [2.07] 
Have cell phone 0.046*** 0.039*** 0.018*** -0.0049 0.0081 0.025** 
  [10.6] [7.91] [6.06] [-0.26] [0.40] [1.96] 
 
Notes: Robust t-statistics in brackets, ***, ** and * denote 1, 5 and 10 percent level of 
significance, respectively. All regressions are clustered at the Strata level. ╬ denotes a Hansen 
p-value greater than 0.10. Other controls include a rural dummy, the asset index, a dummy 
equal to one if the mother has ever taken out a loan, a dummy equal to one if the mother is 
aware of programs that provide credit or loans, a dummy for not working, dummy for 
working in agriculture, a literacy dummy, low education dummy, age, husband's years of 
education, husband's age, household size, dummy for the household having agricultural land, 
the reasons for sex dummy, dummy variable if the woman belongs to a scheduled caste, 
scheduled tribe, or other backwards caste. 
 
 
Our final robustness test, available upon request, focuses on the possibility that the results are 
driven by multiple children from a few households. That is, it is plausible that a few 
constrained mothers with many children are driving the results. We estimated Lewbel (I+E) 
regressions using only information from one child from each household and find consistent 
results. Mothers constrained by emotional violence, restrictions on the use of household 
earnings, and lack of information from newspapers are more likely to have children that are 
MODA deprived in at least two dimensions. 
 
 
6. Concluding Remarks  
This paper presents evidence that constraints on women are significantly associated with 
child deprivations. Our econometric analysis uncovers a causal and statistically significant 
relationship between women experiencing constraints (emotional abuse, restrictions on the 
use of household earnings, as well as access to health facilities) and child deprivation. We 
measure child deprivation using indicators of access to adequate water, sanitation, housing, 
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healthcare, nutrition, education, and information. Our more general conclusion is that societal 
changes that relax constraints on women have potential complementary benefits for their 
children.  
 
Consequently, it is important that analyses showing welfare gains of relaxing constraints on 
women – often referred to as women’s empowerment – account for potential additional intra-
household benefits and examine the channels through which they operate.  In addition to the 
intrinsic value of this additional benefit, it may also represent a secondary cause of the 
observed impacts on child wellbeing. For example, part of the observed impact of a poverty 
program on child outcomes may result indirectly from the lower constraints on women 
caused by the program.  Our results point to the importance of including measures of the 
impacts on women’s constraints in all evaluations of programs to reduce poverty and 
otherwise aid children.   
 
Finally, we note that there may be localized “network effects,” or complementarities, in 
relaxing constraints; there may be local equilibria in achieving empowerment (and realizing 
its benefits), in which case it may be easier for a woman to reduce constraints when a larger 
fraction of women in their local area are free of the same constraints. This, too, we leave for 
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Table A1: Summary statistics  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Child is deprived in           
2+ dimensions 104,415 0.36 0.48 0 1 
1+ dimensions 104,415 0.69 0.46 0 1 
3+ dimensions 104,415 0.12 0.32 0 1 
Constraints           
Physical violence 104,415 0.27 0.44 0 1 
Emotional violence 104,398 0.11 0.32 0 1 
At least 1 reason to beat 
wife 
102,525 0.43 0.50 0 1 
Can't decide: Earnings 95,673 0.77 0.42 0 1 
Can't decide: Healthcare 104,398 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Can't decide: Purchases 104,398 0.25 0.43 0 1 
Can't decide: Visits 104,398 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Can't decide: Contraception 62,186 0.08 0.28 0 1 
Can't go: Market 104,415 0.09 0.28 0 1 
Can't go: Health facility 104,415 0.06 0.23 0 1 
Can't go: Out of village 104,415 0.49 0.50 0 1 
Doesn’t’ read newspapers 104,415 0.71 0.45 0 1 
Doesn’t listen to radio 104,415 0.86 0.35 0 1 
Doesn’t have a cell phone 104,415 0.54 0.50 0 1 
Controls           
Child is male 104,415 0.53 0.50 0 1 
Age of the child (years) 104,415 7.86 4.80 0 17 
Rural 104,415 0.74 0.44 0 1 
Wealth Index 104,415 -0.04 1.44 -3.75 6.82 
Aware of credit 104,415 0.67 0.47 0 1 
Taken a loan 104,415 0.36 0.48 0 1 
Woman is not working 104,415 0.07 0.25 0 1 
Works in agriculture 104,415 0.19 0.39 0 1 
Can read full sentence 104,415 0.49 0.50 0 1 
Mother has low education 104,415 0.54 0.50 0 1 
Mother's age 104,415 32.60 6.41 15 49 
Father's years of education 104,415 7.00 4.92 0 20 
Father's age 104,415 37.33 7.55 15 95 
Household size 104,415 5.68 1.97 2 38 









Appendix B –  
 
Table B1: Violence constraints and children’s deprivation (2+), OLS and Probit 
(marginal effects)  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES/MODEL OLS Probit OLS Probit OLS Probit 
Violence type:              
Physical 0.017*** 0.018***     
 [3.28] [3.12]     
Emotional   0.029*** 0.034***   
   [4.20] [4.52]   
At least 1 reason to beat 
wife 
    0.012*** 0.018*** 
     [2.64] [3.40] 
Child is male -0.0033 -0.0037 -0.0032 -0.0035 -0.0022 -0.0024 
 [-1.31] [-1.19] [-1.26] [-1.14] [-0.88] [-0.79] 
Age of the child (years) -0.017*** -0.020*** -0.017*** -0.020*** -0.018*** -0.021*** 
 [-40.2] [-37.5] [-40.2] [-37.5] [-40.6] [-37.9] 
Rural 0.21*** 0.28*** 0.21*** 0.28*** 0.21*** 0.29*** 
 [29.8] [30.7] [29.8] [30.8] [30.0] [31.0] 
Wealth index -0.087*** -0.12*** -0.087*** -0.12*** -0.086*** -0.12*** 
 [-43.8] [-45.3] [-43.8] [-45.2] [-44.3] [-45.8] 
Aware of credit -0.036*** -0.043*** -0.036*** -0.043*** -0.036*** -0.044*** 
 [-7.31] [-7.03] [-7.32] [-7.04] [-7.46] [-7.18] 
Taken a loan -0.016* -0.0057 -0.016* -0.0058 -0.016* -0.0066 
 [-1.83] [-0.51] [-1.83] [-0.53] [-1.90] [-0.60] 
Woman is not working -0.025*** -0.027*** -0.025*** -0.027*** -0.026*** -0.028*** 
 [-4.40] [-3.54] [-4.36] [-3.48] [-4.54] [-3.62] 
Works in agriculture 0.019** 0.015 0.019** 0.015* 0.017** 0.013 
 [2.38] [1.63] [2.40] [1.66] [2.16] [1.42] 
Can read full sentence -0.068*** -0.057*** -0.068*** -0.057*** -0.068*** -0.057*** 
 [-5.48] [-4.04] [-5.48] [-4.02] [-5.58] [-4.17] 
Mother has low education 0.015 0.035** 0.015 0.035** 0.015 0.034** 
 [1.26] [2.51] [1.28] [2.53] [1.23] [2.45] 
Mother's age 0.00052 -0.0010 0.00052 -0.0010 0.00060 -0.00096 
  [0.85] [-1.35] [0.85] [-1.35] [0.99] [-1.27] 
Father's years of education -0.0090*** -0.011*** -0.0090*** -0.011*** -0.0090*** -0.011*** 
 [-16.4] [-17.2] [-16.4] [-17.2] [-16.6] [-17.4] 
Father's age -0.00067 -0.00085 -0.00070 -0.00087 -0.00084* -0.0010* 
 [-1.36] [-1.41] [-1.41] [-1.45] [-1.70] [-1.70] 
Household size 0.022*** 0.029*** 0.022*** 0.029*** 0.022*** 0.029*** 
 [19.9] [21.7] [19.9] [21.7] [20.2] [22.0] 
Has agricultural land 0.0060 0.011* 0.0061 0.011* 0.0045 0.0091 
 [1.22] [1.91] [1.23] [1.92] [0.91] [1.58] 
State FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 104,415 104,415 104,398 104,398 107,132 107,132 
R-squared 0.28  0.28  0.28  
Pseudo R-squared  0.26  0.26  0.26 
Chi-squared p-value  0  0  0 
 
Notes: Robust t-statistics in brackets, ***, ** and * denote 1, 5 and 10 percent level of 







Table B2: Decision constraints and children’s deprivation (2+), OLS and Probit 
(marginal effects) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES/MODEL OLS Probit OLS Probit OLS Probit OLS Probit OLS Probit 
No decision power in:                     
Earnings 0.027** 0.026**         
 [2.46] [2.10]         
Healthcare   0.015*** 0.019***       
   [3.16] [3.39]       
Purchases     0.012** 0.016***     
     [2.52] [2.96]     
Visits       0.015*** 0.019***   
       [3.14] [3.38]   
Contraception         0.015 0.017* 
          [1.59] [1.70] 
Child is male -0.0028 -0.0032 -0.0026 -0.0029 -0.0026 -0.0028 -0.0025 -0.0028 -0.0033 -0.0038 
 [-1.11] [-1.03] [-1.06] [-0.96] [-1.05] [-0.94] [-1.04] [-0.93] [-1.06] [-1.05] 
Age of the child (years) -0.017*** -0.020*** -0.017*** -0.020*** -0.017*** -0.020*** -0.017*** -0.020*** -0.015*** -0.016*** 
 [-39.0] [-36.5] [-40.6] [-38.0] [-40.6] [-37.9] [-40.6] [-38.0] [-26.7] [-24.6] 
Rural 0.21*** 0.28*** 0.21*** 0.28*** 0.21*** 0.28*** 0.21*** 0.28*** 0.19*** 0.25*** 
 [29.9] [30.9] [30.2] [31.1] [30.1] [31.1] [30.2] [31.1] [24.9] [25.9] 
Wealth Index -0.085*** -0.12*** -0.087*** -0.12*** -0.087*** -0.12*** -0.087*** -0.12*** -0.086*** -0.12*** 
 [-42.9] [-44.7] [-44.5] [-46.0] [-44.6] [-46.0] [-44.5] [-46.0] [-36.3] [-37.1] 
Aware of credit -0.037*** -0.045*** -0.035*** -0.042*** -0.035*** -0.042*** -0.035*** -0.042*** -0.028*** -0.032*** 
 [-7.39] [-7.17] [-7.30] [-7.00] [-7.33] [-7.02] [-7.32] [-7.02] [-4.74] [-4.65] 
Taken a loan -0.015* -0.0043 -0.015* -0.0056 -0.015* -0.0055 -0.015* -0.0057 -0.032*** -0.023* 
 [-1.72] [-0.39] [-1.82] [-0.51] [-1.81] [-0.50] [-1.82] [-0.52] [-3.16] [-1.84] 
Woman is not working -0.053*** -0.054*** -0.027*** -0.029*** -0.027*** -0.029*** -0.027*** -0.029*** -0.036*** -0.036*** 
 [-4.74] [-4.18] [-4.77] [-3.88] [-4.72] [-3.86] [-4.73] [-3.86] [-5.02] [-4.14] 
Works in agriculture 0.022** 0.013 0.018** 0.014 0.018** 0.014 0.018** 0.014 0.026*** 0.017* 
 [2.42] [1.29] [2.32] [1.58] [2.30] [1.56] [2.29] [1.55] [2.66] [1.69] 
Can read full sentence -0.078*** -0.068*** -0.071*** -0.060*** -0.071*** -0.060*** -0.071*** -0.060*** -0.063*** -0.047*** 
 [-6.17] [-4.75] [-5.78] [-4.35] [-5.80] [-4.36] [-5.80] [-4.37] [-4.20] [-2.95] 
Mother has low education 0.0086 0.026* 0.013 0.032** 0.013 0.032** 0.013 0.032** 0.019 0.040** 
 [0.70] [1.83] [1.14] [2.37] [1.13] [2.36] [1.12] [2.34] [1.32] [2.52] 
Mother's age 0.00085 -0.00056 0.00036 -0.0012 0.00036 -0.0012 0.00037 -0.0011 0.00044 -0.0014 
  [1.38] [-0.74] [0.61] [-1.60] [0.61] [-1.60] [0.64] [-1.58] [0.54] [-1.42] 
Father's years of education -0.0090*** -0.011*** -0.0091*** -0.011*** -0.0091*** -0.011*** -0.0091*** -0.011*** -0.0074*** -0.0090*** 
 [-16.1] [-16.8] [-16.7] [-17.5] [-16.7] [-17.5] [-16.7] [-17.5] [-10.5] [-11.5] 
Father's age -0.0011** -0.0014** -0.00069 -0.00090 -0.00068 -0.00090 -0.00068 -0.00090 -0.00064 -0.00074 
 [-2.30] [-2.44] [-1.45] [-1.55] [-1.44] [-1.55] [-1.44] [-1.55] [-0.97] [-0.96] 
Household size 0.022*** 0.029*** 0.022*** 0.029*** 0.022*** 0.029*** 0.022*** 0.029*** 0.021*** 0.026*** 
 [19.2] [20.9] [20.0] [21.8] [19.9] [21.7] [20.0] [21.7] [14.2] [15.6] 
Has agricultural land 0.0050 0.0087 0.0036 0.0080 0.0036 0.0080 0.0035 0.0080 0.0018 0.0044 
 [0.99] [1.49] [0.73] [1.41] [0.73] [1.40] [0.72] [1.40] [0.30] [0.66] 
State FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 100,126 100,126 109,206 109,206 109,206 109,206 109,206 109,206 64,409 64,409 
R-squared 0.28  0.27  0.27  0.27  0.25  
Pseudo R-squared  0.26  0.26  0.26  0.26  0.25 
Chi-squared p-value  0  0  0  0  0 
 
Notes: Robust t-statistics in brackets, ***, ** and * denote 1, 5 and 10 percent level of 























Table B3: Mobility constraints and children’s deprivation (2+), OLS and Probit 
(marginal effects) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES/MODEL OLS Probit OLS Probit OLS Probit 
Not allowed to go to:             
Market 0.013* 0.012     
 [1.72] [1.42]     
Health facility   0.022** 0.023**   
   [2.48] [2.31]   
Outside the village     0.0050 0.0089* 
      [1.16] [1.71] 
Child is male -0.0026 -0.0029 -0.0026 -0.0029 -0.0026 -0.0029 
 [-1.07] [-0.97] [-1.07] [-0.97] [-1.07] [-0.98] 
Age of the child (years) -0.017*** -0.020*** -0.017*** -0.020*** -0.017*** -0.020*** 
 [-40.6] [-38.0] [-40.6] [-38.1] [-40.6] [-38.0] 
Rural 0.21*** 0.28*** 0.21*** 0.28*** 0.21*** 0.28*** 
 [30.2] [31.1] [30.2] [31.1] [30.2] [31.1] 
Wealth Index -0.087*** -0.12*** -0.087*** -0.12*** -0.087*** -0.12*** 
 [-44.6] [-46.1] [-44.6] [-46.1] [-44.6] [-46.1] 
Aware of credit -0.027*** -0.029*** -0.027*** -0.029*** -0.027*** -0.029*** 
 [-4.67] [-3.78] [-4.68] [-3.79] [-4.70] [-3.87] 
Taken a loan -0.036*** -0.043*** -0.035*** -0.043*** -0.035*** -0.043*** 
 [-7.45] [-7.15] [-7.42] [-7.11] [-7.44] [-7.10] 
Woman is not working -0.015* -0.0056 -0.015* -0.0057 -0.015* -0.0054 
 [-1.79] [-0.51] [-1.80] [-0.52] [-1.78] [-0.49] 
Works in agriculture 0.018** 0.014 0.018** 0.014 0.018** 0.014 
 [2.33] [1.61] [2.33] [1.60] [2.32] [1.57] 
Can read full sentence -0.071*** -0.061*** -0.071*** -0.060*** -0.071*** -0.060*** 
 [-5.81] [-4.38] [-5.80] [-4.38] [-5.81] [-4.37] 
Mother has low education 0.014 0.032** 0.014 0.032** 0.013 0.032** 
 [1.15] [2.37] [1.15] [2.37] [1.14] [2.37] 
Mother's age 0.00035 -0.0012 0.00036 -0.0012 0.00035 -0.0012 
 [0.59] [-1.63] [0.61] [-1.61] [0.60] [-1.59] 
Father's years of education -0.0091*** -0.011*** -0.0091*** -0.011*** -0.0091*** -0.011*** 
 [-16.7] [-17.5] [-16.7] [-17.5] [-16.7] [-17.5] 
Father's age -0.00068 -0.00089 -0.00069 -0.00090 -0.00067 -0.00088 
 [-1.44] [-1.55] [-1.46] [-1.57] [-1.41] [-1.52] 
Household size 0.022*** 0.029*** 0.022*** 0.029*** 0.022*** 0.029*** 
 [20.2] [22.0] [20.2] [22.0] [20.2] [22.0] 
Has agricultural land 0.0037 0.0082 0.0037 0.0082 0.0038 0.0082 
 [0.76] [1.45] [0.75] [1.44] [0.77] [1.45] 
State FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 109,224 109,224 109,224 109,224 109,224 109,224 
R-squared 0.27  0.27  0.27  
Pseudo R-squared  0.26  0.26  0.26 
Chi-squared p-value  0  0  0 
 
Notes: Robust t-statistics in brackets, ***, ** and * denote 1, 5 and 10 percent level of 










Table B4: Information constraints and children’s deprivation (2+), OLS and Probit 
(marginal effects) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES/MODEL OLS Probit OLS Probit OLS Probit 
Mother does not       
Read newspapers 0.022*** 0.055***     
 [4.31] [7.92]     
Listen to radio   -0.0090 -0.012   
   [-1.47] [-1.57]   
Have cell phone     0.040*** 0.049*** 
     [8.22] [8.76] 
Child is male -0.0026 -0.0029 -0.0026 -0.0029 -0.0029 -0.0033 
 [-1.05] [-0.95] [-1.06] [-0.96] [-1.20] [-1.08] 
Age of the child (years) -0.017*** -0.021*** -0.017*** -0.020*** -0.017*** -0.021*** 
 [-40.7] [-38.1] [-40.7] [-38.1] [-40.8] [-38.2] 
Rural 0.20*** 0.28*** 0.21*** 0.28*** 0.20*** 0.28*** 
 [29.7] [30.6] [30.2] [31.1] [29.0] [30.2] 
Wealth Index -0.086*** -0.12*** -0.087*** -0.12*** -0.084*** -0.12*** 
 [-43.9] [-45.2] [-44.6] [-46.1] [-42.7] [-44.4] 
Aware of credit -0.035*** -0.042*** -0.036*** -0.043*** -0.034*** -0.041*** 
 [-7.38] [-6.98] [-7.50] [-7.21] [-7.04] [-6.74] 
Taken a loan -0.015* -0.0046 -0.015* -0.0058 -0.014 -0.0036 
 [-1.77] [-0.42] [-1.81] [-0.53] [-1.64] [-0.33] 
Woman is not working -0.027*** -0.031*** -0.026*** -0.028*** -0.029*** -0.031*** 
 [-4.79] [-4.03] [-4.58] [-3.70] [-5.01] [-4.10] 
Works in agriculture 0.017** 0.012 0.019** 0.015* 0.015* 0.0099 
 [2.20] [1.30] [2.37] [1.65] [1.85] [1.10] 
Can read full sentence -0.065*** -0.045*** -0.071*** -0.061*** -0.068*** -0.056*** 
 [-5.28] [-3.24] [-5.84] [-4.41] [-5.54] [-4.09] 
Mother has low education 0.011 0.027** 0.014 0.032** 0.0098 0.028** 
 [0.93] [2.01] [1.15] [2.38] [0.82] [2.07] 
Mother's age 0.00038 -0.0011 0.00030 -0.0012* 0.00019 -0.0014* 
 [0.65] [-1.54] [0.52] [-1.71] [0.33] [-1.92] 
Father's years of education -0.0088*** -0.011*** -0.0091*** -0.011*** -0.0087*** -0.011*** 
 [-16.2] [-16.8] [-16.7] [-17.5] [-15.9] [-16.8] 
Father's age -0.00065 -0.00084 -0.00067 -0.00087 -0.00061 -0.00080 
 [-1.38] [-1.46] [-1.41] [-1.51] [-1.29] [-1.39] 
Household size 0.022*** 0.029*** 0.022*** 0.029*** 0.021*** 0.028*** 
 [20.2] [22.0] [20.3] [22.1] [19.5] [21.3] 
Has agricultural land 0.0033 0.0072 0.0040 0.0085 0.0028 0.0072 
 [0.68] [1.26] [0.81] [1.49] [0.58] [1.27] 
State FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 109,224 109,224 109,224 109,224 109,224 109,224 
R-squared 0.27  0.27  0.28  
Pseudo R-squared 0.26  0.26  0.26 
Chi-squared p-value  0  0  0 
Notes: Robust t-statistics in brackets, ***, ** and * denote 1, 5 and 10 percent level of 











Table B5: Lewbel (I+E) summary of results with Hansen tests 
 
 Lewbel (I+E) Lewbel (I) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6) 
VARIABLES Estimates t-stat Hansen J p-value Estimates t-stat Hansen J p-value 
Physical violence 0.0041 [0.38] 0.18 0.0035 [0.33] 0.18 
Emotional violence 0.044*** [2.96] 0.37 0.043*** [2.92] 0.38 
OK to beat wife 0.0086 [0.52] 0.027 0.0012 [0.071] 0.046 
Can't decide: Earnings 0.027** [2.41] 0.36 0.027** [2.41] 0.34 
Can't decide: Healthcare 0.0063 [0.40] 0.13 0.0036 [0.22] 0.13 
Can't decide: Purchases 0.019 [1.19] 0.052 0.016 [0.98] 0.053 
Can't decide: Visits 0.010 [0.71] 0.18 0.0072 [0.50] 0.18 
Can't decide: Contraception 0.042 [1.62] 0.72 0.043* [1.67] 0.69 
Can't go: Market 0.012 [1.10] 0.046 0.012 [1.11] 0.062 
Can't go: Health facility 0.021* [1.78] 0.65 0.021* [1.76] 0.74 
Can't go: Out of village 0.015 [0.78] 0.014 0.0099 [0.50] 0.018 
Read newspapers 0.045*** [7.33] 0.000031 0.045*** [7.34] 0.000039 
Listens to radio 0.0054 [0.43] 0.047 0.0067 [0.53] 0.057 
Have cell phone 0.024 [1.11] 0.016 0.023 [1.07] 0.018 
Notes: t-statistics in brackets, ***, ** and * denote 1, 5 and 10 percent level of significance, 
respectively. All regressions are clustered at the Strata level. Other controls include child 
gender, age, location, the wealth index, a dummy equal to one if the mother has ever taken 
out a loan, a dummy equal to one if the mother is aware of programs that provide credit or 
loans, a dummy for whether the mother is not working or if she works in agriculture, a 
dummy for whether the mother can read a full sentence, mother’s education, agricultural 
land, and household size.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
